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BOOK REVIEW
BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM. By A.
D. H. Kaplan. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute,
1954. Pp. xii, 269. $4.00.
Mr. Kaplan's book is the first fruit of a study of big business which
has been under way at the Brookings Institution since 1948. The study
is still continuing, and presumably further, publication is contemplated.
The purpose of the volume is "to explore those aspects of big business
participation in American industry that may reveal whether it is or is not
compatible with the objectives of competitive private enterprise" (p. 1).
This broad appraisal is conceived as dependent upon two basic questions:
"First, has the growth of big business tended to narrow the opportunities
for new enterprise by concentrating employment, assets, and market con-
trol in the hands of a few industrial giants? . . . Second, is the com-
petition in which big business engages of a kind that is regulated in the last
analysis by big business policies or by the market forces inherent in the
system itself?" (p. 234). These two questions are regarded by Mr. Kaplan
as the keys to the relation of big business respectively to the structure of
industries and markets and to competitive performance. In seeking to
answer them in the initial volume of his continuing study, Mr. Kaplan
appears to have placed his sweeping appraisal before rather than after his
more detailed work.
The two parts of the book, each devoted to one of Mr. Kaplan's two
basic questions, are of different kind and quality. The first part is a
statistical analysis of the extent and trend of industrial concentration. It
contains some of the best summaries of the limitations of concentration data
that are to be found in print; but unfortunately, as will appear below, the
interpretations of the new data which it contains are uncritically optimistic
at crucial points. The second part of the book consists of a provocatively
stimulating interpretation of the incentives and main lines of policy thought
to be characteristic of big business. In this part much that is new and
persuasive is to be found but much that is old and obvious is ignored, while
the whole is interpreted with an unflagging optimism that is almost lyrical.
Even a long review cannot cover this compact body of ideas and evaluations
except by brief characterization and example.
Mr. Kaplan's analysis of the place of big business in the structure of
industries and markets becomes the basis for a conclusion that this struc-
ture "evidently is appropriate to dynamic competition" (p. 240). This
conclusion is reached in spite of the fact that Mr. Kaplan finds essentially
the same high level of concentration which has been noted in other recent
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studies.1 This concentration does not disturb him for four principal rea-
sons: first, during the last quarter century or more, the place of the largest
industrial corporations in the economy has not grown, but has become
slightly smaller; second, the total business population has grown during
the same period; third, the development of inter-product competition and
the consequent weakening of industrial boundaries have largely destroyed
the significance of figures of concentration for particular products or in-
dustries; fourth, the largest 100 industrial corporations do not have a secure
place at the top of the corporate pyramid, but instead constitute a changing
group.
When carefully examined, Mr. Kaplan's grounds for optimism about
the extent of industrial concentration are not persuasive. His facts need
not be seriously disputed,2 but his interpretations are questionable. His
evidence as to the trend of concentration is sufficient to discredit the view
that concentration is growing catastrophically, as it was when Berle and
Means published their pioneering study more than two decades ago. How-
ever, since it is clear that the largest industrial corporations are growing at
roughly the same rate as the total volume of business, we cannot expect
the problems raised by concentration to be solved merely by expansion of
the economy. The persistence of the present level of concentration must
trouble observers who think anti-competitive effects are now apparent.
There may be various interpretations of the fact that the total number
of firms is growing as fast as the population. It may mean, as Mr. Kaplan
apparently thinks, that small new concerns can compete successfully against
established large rivals and that there is a considerable field of new in-
dustry for the small business pioneer. It may mean merely that a segment
of the economy in which business is typically small is growing as the whole
economy grows-that, as manufacturing becomes more mechanized, special-
ized, and geographically remote from its market, there is an expansion of
distribution and of the service trades. It may mean that where large
concerns are dominant they prefer to buy from and sell to smaller ones
which are relatively docile, so that maintenance of the power of the large
1. He reports that 260 firms, each with more than 10,000 employees, accounted
for 22% of all business employment in 1948; that the 100 largest industrial companies
accounted in 1948 for nearly 27% of the assets of all industrial corporations and
for 30% of the profits of all such concerns; that in more than half the product
groups for which one can ascertain concentration in 1937, four firms or fewer produced
70% or more of the total output; and that diversification of the largest manufacturing
companies gives them power and influence beyond that which is apparent in the
figures for particular markets.
2. Though Mr. Kaplan's presentation of his statistics is a model of caution, he
omits certain figures relevant to his thesis. The most important omission is the
Federal Trade Commission's finding that from 1935 to 1950 the proportion of all
manufacturing shipments made by the largest 200 manufacturing corporations rose
from 37.7% to 40.5%. FTC, REPoRT ON CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION IN MANU-
FACTURING 1937 TO 1947 AND 1950, at 17 (1954). Presumably the report containing
these figures was issued after his volume had gone to press. But the factual point
at issue is a narrow one-whether concentration in manufacturing has risen slightly
or fallen slightly. That the changes since 1929 have not been great is now generally
recognized.
BOOK REVIEW
enterprise involves maintenance of a considerable number of nominally in-
dependent satellite suppliers and customers. Before interpreting the fig-
ures optimistically or pessimistically, one needs to know whether the large
and small concerns are in the same fields, and whether the small ones gen-
erally are independent ventures capable of growth, like Minute Maid, or are
Charlie McCarthies like the so-called independent filling stations that lease
their premises from a major oil company.
It is obvious that technological change has tended to increase the com-
petition of substitutes and that in particular cases such competition has
diminished or destroyed the significance of concentrated control over par-
ticular products. Because of these facts, statistics of concentration for par-
ticular industries and product groups should be used with caution. But
there is a wide gap between recognition that substitutes mitigate the impact
of concentration and Mr. Kaplan's belief that they are important enough to
deprive concentration of significance. There are instances where goods
that might be substitutes do not compete because they are controlled by
the same corporate interests, where concerns reciprocally refrain from in-
vading markets which they know are important to powerful neighbors,
where no satisfactory substitute is known, and where the existence of a
substitute limits the power of a monopoly but leaves a significant part of
that power unbroken. These instances, like those in which there are satis-
factory substitutes, have not been statistically measured, but like the in-
stances of satisfactory substitutes, they should not for that reason be
ignored. Mr. Kaplan's exposition does not touch them, and his optimism
does not appear to be diminished by them.
Mr. Kaplan relies most strongly upon his fourth point, that the largest
100 corporations have been a changing group. Listing these concerns
for the years 1909, 1919, 1929, 1935 and 1948, he finds that the industrial
composition of the list has changed materially and that there have been
many changes in the identity and relative place of the companies included.
The shifts among industries mean to him a variation of growth patterns
"as new and improved products have challenged established lines and their
markets" (p. 135). The changing list of companies is interpreted as mean-
ing "that integration, size and competition can and do go together" (p. 195)
and that "we are not justified in identifying increase of financial resources
of large-scale enterprise with net decline in the scope and vigor of com-
petition" (p. 144).
While it is true that there are substantial changes in Mr. Kaplan's
list of companies, there are also striking stabilities therein, particularly
at the top of the list. An outstanding case is that of U. S. Steel Corpora-
tion. Organized in 1901 with large amounts of water in its capital struc-
ture, operated before the First World War in a way that sheltered other
steel makers under a price umbrella, and admittedly plagued after the war
by inefficiencies that necessitated a broad program of rehabilitation about
1938, this company, in spite of its weaknesses, does not stand lower than
third among the largest industrial corporations in any of the lists from 1909
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to 1948. For the same period the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,
in spite of a judicial dissolution in 1911, has not stood lower than second.
General Electric Company's standing has ranged only between sixteenth
and ninth. After the largest motor manufacturers attained a place on the
list in 1919, General Motors ranged only between fifth and second; Ford
only between seventh and tenth. In 1948 the ten companies standing at the
head of the list possessed 36.55 per cent of the total assets of the 100 cor-
porations. The lowest rank of any of these companies in 1935 was thir-
teenth; in 1929 fifteenth; and in 1919 thirty-fourth.8 In 1948 the twenty
companies standing at the top of the list possessed 52.5 per cent of the
total assets of the entire 100. Fifteen of them were among the top twenty
in 1935 and 1929, and thirteen were among the top twenty in 1919. One,
Western Electric Company, was not on the list in these previous years.
Among the rest of the twenty, the lowest rank was thirty-second in 1935,
twenty-ninth in 1929, and thirty-fourth in 1919. One must go as far back
as the 1909 list to find this leading group seriously dispersed.
4
Moreover, the changes in the full list of 100 corporations do not justify
Mr. Kaplan's presumption that competitive exploitation of new products
and processes was the sole cause worth mentioning. Even if every concern
in the list had been an entrenched monopoly in 1909, there would have been
ground for astonishment if the list in 1919 and again in 1948 had not shown
changes reflecting wartime shifts in the pattern of industry.6 It would have
been almost equally astonishing if the list in 1935, a depression year, had
not shown a different place for purveyors of inexpensive food than the list
for the boom year 1929.6 However strong a group of monopolistic com-
3. The ranking for 1919 was substantially affected by the judicial dissolution
of the old Standard Oil Company in 1911, as a result of which new oil companies
appeared in the industry and previous monopoly conditions were disrupted. For this
reason, the ranking of the oil companies in the 1919 list may be regarded as a
special case. The other five companies which stood in the first ten in 1948 ranked
in 1919 respectively first, fifth, seventh, eleventh, and eighteenth.
4. These relative stabilities at the top of the list cannot safely be regarded as
proof that the manufacturing economy is monopolized. The stabilities, like the
changes, probably have various explanations. Of the largest twenty companies in
1948, seven were oil companies, two steel maufacturers, two motor vehicle manu-
facturers, three electrical manufacturers, two chemical manufacturers and the re-
maining four from tobacco and farm machinery manufacturing, copper mining, and
mail order merchandising. The oil companies, motor vehicle manufacturers and
steel manufacturers were among the largest twenty companies in 1935 and 1929,
along with one of the electrical manufacturers and one of the chemical manufacturers.
Thus much of the stability of the position of the largest corporations probably ex-
presses the large scale organization that characterizes certain particular industries
and the persistent importance of those industries in the economy. If this stable
structure is inconsistent with competition-an inference made here only for contrast to
Mr. Kaplan's view that instability proves the vigor of competition-the inconsistency
centers in the particular industries, and is not necessarily representative of the
manufacturing economy as a whole.
5. For example, Bethlehem Steel Company, thirty-first in the 1909 list, had
risen to sixth place in 1919. Midvale Steel and Ordinance Company, not included in
the 1909 list, stood tenth in 1919. It was acquired by Bethlehem in 1923.
6. For example, Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company rose from sixty-seventh
place in 1929 to thirty-seventh in 1935.
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panies might have been in 1909, it is scarcely conceivable that they could
have pre-empted all the opportunities of new industries, particularly those
industries which, like automobile manufacturing and motion picture pro-
duction, were initially thought by most observers to have a limited future.
Though the fact that motor vehicle manufacturers and moving picture
producers have climbed to a place among the 100 largest is a tribute to the
dynamic character of the economy, it demonstrates nothing significant about
the vigor of competition either in the motor vehicle and motion picture
industries or in the industries of the concerns they displaced. So long as
an economy is growing and the social environment changes under the
catastrophic impact of war and depression, even a group of powerful
monopolies may be expected to grow at different rates. To prevent changes
in relative position would require monopoly control much stronger than is
thought to exist by even the most pessimistic critic of big business.
A portion of the changes in Mr. Kaplan's list appears to have been
directly traceable to anti-trust proceedings designed to break up industrial
monopolies. The second company on the 1909 list is the Standard Oil
Company; the third is the American Tobacco Company. Both companies
were dissolved by judicial decree in 1911. As a result of these dissolutions
a number of new corporations were formed, and several of these were
large enough to appear in the list for 1919.7 The duPont powder company,
also on the 1909 list, was likewise dissolved in 1911, but only the part
which retained the duPont name was large enough in 1919 to be included
in the list for that year. Two large meat packers, Armour and Swift,
stood high on the list in 1909 and even higher in 1919; a third, Cudahy,
rose from ninety-fourth in 1909 to sixty-sixth in 1919. In 1920 the packers'
consent decree struck down the sources of the power of the leading packers,
and in subsequent lists the position of all three packers was lower.8 In-
ternational Harvester Company stood fifth upon the list in 1909. In 1918
it consented to a decree of partial dissolution which was widely criticized
as ineffective; in 1919 it stood thirteenth on the list, and thereafter did
not stand higher than fourteenth. Various later anti-monopoly proceedings
probably had effects similar to those mentioned above. It is surprising
to see the results of the action of the government against monopolies in-
cluded, with all other types of change, as evidence of the essentially com-
petitive character of large business enterprises. It is also surprising that
Mr. Kaplan's inferences from the statistics have not been modified in the
light of the record of monopolistic practices indulged in by some of the big
companies, as revealed in judicial proceedings like those mentioned above.
7. For example, Standard Gil Company of New York, Standard Oil Company of
California, Standard Oil Company of Indiana, Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company,
P. Lorillard Company, and IR J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
8. Armour fell from third in 1919 to fourteenth in 1929, twentieth in 1935, and
thirtieth in 1948. Swift fell from fourth in 1919, to nineteenth in 1929 and 1935 and
27th in 1948. Cudahy was not on the list for 1929, stood ninety-fifth in 1935, and
was not on the list in 1948.
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One means by which particular companies have attained greater ab-
solute and relative size has been merger with other corporations. There
was a substantial merger movement in the 192 0's; another is in progress
today. The importance of these movements can be illustrated in the case
of the steel industry. Nine steel companies were among the hundred
largest industrial companies in 1948. For seven of these the Federal Trade
Commission has estimated the percentage of total growth between 1915 and
1945 which was due to the acquisition of other companies. 9 For the Re-
public Steel Corporation this percentage was 63.8; for Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, 33.4; for Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 28.5; for American
Rolling Mill, 20; for Jones & Laughlin, 15.7; for Inland Steel, 9.6; and
for U. S. Steel, 6.9. Concerns which, by acquiring other companies, have
entered the largest 100, or risen in relative place within the 100, cannot
safely be said to have grown through the competitive vigor of their inno-
vations; nor can the instability of the entire list be regarded as evidence
of fluctuating competitive fortunes in the market in so far as it is due to
this type of change.
Even if the fluctuations in the lists were solely due to the causes
emphasized by Mr. Kaplan, his evidence of the precarious tenure of in-
dustrial leadership could not be safely taken as proof that the companies
involved are vigorously competitive. Monopoly power often results in
lethargy, technological stagnation, and rising costs. In such cases the
monopoly may retain control for a considerable time in spite of its in-
efficiency, but may lose parts of its market, decline in size, and eventually
succumb to substitute goods or to new competitors. So far as the changes
in Mr. Kaplan's lists may express such influences, they reflect both mo-
nopolistic and competitive forces interacting with each other, and do not
justify a blanket appraisal of the entire process as a demonstration of
competitive virtue.
The discussion of the incentives and policies of large business enter-
prises which appears in the latter part of the book consists mostly of ma-
terial which is fresh and significant and which has received insufficient
emphasis. It sets forth the influences within the business enterprise which
make for expansion, innovation, and competitive action as means to satisfy
the ambitions of subordinate executives and departments. It also empha-
sizes competitive incentives that are derived from the efforts to maintain
and strengthen the overall position of a large business in ways that may
be inconsistent with short-run maximum profits in each separate market
in which the enterprise may for the moment find itself. Valuable insights
abound in this part of the work, and many of the imperfections which
appear in it must be attributed to its trail-blazing character. Economists
have too long thought of the great corporation as though it had the unity
of purpose of a classical entrepreneur and as though its policies were con-
fined to single markets and were susceptible in each market to traditional
9. FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT 70-134 (1948).
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types of price analysis. Such thinking is distorted, whether it has to do
with monopoly problems or other aspects of the impact of large business
enterprises. Mr. Kaplan has rendered a valuable service in insisting upon
the importance of what is larger than the market and what is less coherent
than the entrepreneur.
It is unfortunate that this contribution to economic thought has been
weakened by a one-sided selection of facts and an over-optimistic interpreta-
tion of them. Doubtless Mr. Kaplan is correct in saying that the drive to
improve the large company's position brings it into conflict with other large
companies and provides an incentive for expansion that is often inconsistent
with monopolistic impulses. Doubtless, too, he is right in regarding the
functional specialization of the departments of a large concern as an influ-
ence toward dynamic innovations. One looks in vain, however, for sig-
nificant shadows in his bright picture. He pays little attention to non-
competitive techniques for building and defending a company's position-
the pre-emption of raw materials and market channels, the erection of patent
fences, predatory litigation, political favoritism, agreements to allocate or
share markets. He finds it possible to discuss the fluctuations of copper
prices without mentioning the three successive copper cartels, the second
of which, in the latter part of the 1920's, was conspicuous among the
influences making for accumulation of inventory and subsequent precipi-
tous price reductions. In discussing the anti-trust suit against A & P,
he summarizes the attractive features of the company's policy of reducing
prices to attain targets of volume but does not mention the company's use
of local and regional price cutting supported by revenues from other
regions; its efforts to get suppliers to raise the prices which they charged its
competitors; and other less attractive features of its policy. Indeed, one
could not ascertain from his discussion alone that the company was con-
victed under the anti-trust laws and did not choose to appeal the case to
the Supreme Court.
In his appraisals, too, he sees the light without much shadow. For
example, he states that, "The acceptance of long-run demand and cost
analysis by the big firm compels it as a matter of self-interest to effect a
distribution of market benefits equivalent to those that might accrue from
transaction to transaction under atomized competition" (p. 167). The
primary purpose of this statement in the context in which it appears is
to make the point that a large enterprise will forego short-run monopoly
profits where they are inconsistent with its long-run program as determined
by projections of demand and cost. In making this point, however, Mr.
Kaplan equates long-run thinking with competition. One wonders whether
he seriously intends to imply that, apart from competitive pressures, the
policies of a large company will have the same effect as competition in
accelerating change in spite of the pressure of vested interest in obsolete
equipment; in stimulating consumption by sales below cost when demand
has sagged; in holding the planned profit down to a competitive norm; and
in avoiding agreement with rivals for an allocation of fields of business.
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The chapter in which Mr. Kaplan discusses the vertical and horizontal
integration of large companies contains substantially all of his qualifications
of his general thesis that big business is vigorously competitive. In this
chapter he recognizes that absorption of other companies can be, and at
times has been, anti-competitive in its effect, though he insists that much
of it and probably most of it is not of this character. He sees both light
and shadow in vertical integration and in the horizontal acquisition of
potential competitors. He regards such developments as often reducing
competition at particular points, while creating new competition at others.
The competition-promoting aspects are the more vivid to him; but his
recognition of the conflicting nature of the forces at work is a happy con-
trast to the discussion in other chapters. He recommends that large busi-
ness concerns be prompt in sloughing off parts of their structure which
are not functionally serviceable to the rest, in order that they may be more
free to expand where expansion is desirable. In this recommendation, as
nowhere else in the book, he seems to envisage the possibility that great
size may in itself call for question as to future growth, and that bigness
should therefore not be pushed further than necessary.
Corwin D. Edwards t
f Professor of Economics, University of Virginia.
